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Hazards, which were resulted from operation of improper tasks derived from process 
abnormal conditions, cannot be identified effectively by the traditional hazard identification 
methods, such as HAZOP and JSA. A method based on the hazardous information of chemicals 
to identify the hazards of tasks derived from abnormal conditions of processes was proposed. A 
checklist for the intrinsic chemical hazard identification and a worksheet for the process/task 
hazard identification were included in the proposed method. The intrinsic hazards of chemicals 
can be identified based on the hazardous information of chemicals, such as those provided on 
SDS. Combining with the enabling condition of the chemical hazards and the possible tasks 
derived from process abnormal conditions, the tasks derived from process abnormal conditions, 
which will supply the condition of initiating the chemical hazards, were identified. Based on the 
identified tasks, the potential hazards of the tasks can be identified by a pre-designed worksheet, 
and the safeguards and the suggestions can be identified. An example of using the proposed 
method to identify the hazards of tasks derived from process abnormal conditions was included 






An explosion accident resulted in one fatality and one injury occurred in an acrylic 
manufacturing process, in Miaoli, Taiwan, on December 7, 2015 [1, 2]. The incident 
investigation indicated that the feed pipe of benzoyl peroxide (BPO) was knocked by a mallets 
to let the BPO go into the reactor smoothly because the workers believed that BPO was stuck 
in the pipe, although the fact is that the inlet valve was not opened. It is reported in Safety data 
sheet (SDS) that the BPO is explosive in presence of shocks [3]. 
Knocking the feed pipe stuck with BPO, as mentioned above, is not a normal operation, it 
is a trouble shooting task derived out due to abnormal condition of BPO being unable to feed 
into the reactor. Since the trouble shooting tasks, such as the case of feeding the BPO into the 
reactor smoothly, are seldom encountered, the safe operating procedure for such tasks are 
always not included in the standard operating procedure. The operating steps of trouble 
shooting are always focused on how to remove the troubles faced, safety review is not the 
priority and is always ignored. If the hazards of the tasks derived from abnormal conditions of 
processes could be identified beforehand, the safe precautions would be developed and the 
operators be trained in such safe precautions, then the accidents derived from such tasks could 
be prevented. 
Hazard and operability study (HAZOP), failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) and 
What-If analysis are three recommended methods in process hazard analysis by Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) [4] of USA and Hazardous Workplace Review and 
Inspection Rules [5] of Taiwan, and HAZOP is the most frequently used method in hazard 
identification in Taiwan. However, the explosion hazard of BPO as mentioned above cannot be 
identified by the three methods. The shock is not adopted in the process deviation of pipe in 
HAZOP analysis, traditionally, and this deviation will not be assessed in the execution of 
HAZOP. Similarly, the feed pipe stuck with BPO is not a failure mode of FMEA, and this 
scenario will not be evaluated. For the situation of BPO being unable to enter the reactor, the 
consequence is always focus on the impact of no flow of BPO, the reaction cannot be 
proceeded, and is not take into account the impact of tasks derived from removing the trouble 
of no flow of BPO, either for the process deviation of no flow in HAZOP analysis or in 
What-If analysis. Knocking the feed pipe of BPO is not a regular process, it is just a task of 
trouble shooting derived from an abnormal condition of processes, and it is not taken into 
account in the HAZOP, FMEA and What-If analysis. Job safety analysis (JSA) is usually used 
in the hazard identification of operating procedures. However, the accident mentioned above 
cannot be identified by the JSA, because the task of knocking the feed pipe of BPO is derived 
from abnormal condition and is always not included in the standard operating procedures and 
thus is not analyzed by the JSA. The fact we have to recognize that the potential hazards of 
tasks derived from abnormal conditions cannot be identified by the tools of traditional hazard 
identification. Unfortunately, many accidents were resulted from these tasks because the 
operating steps are always determined without safety review in the situation of emergency. A 
method to identify the hazards of tasks derived from abnormal conditions of processes is 




The chemical hazards will be initiated and result in an incident only if under certain 
specific conditions, such as decomposition of hydrogen peroxide only occurred at temperatures 
being high enough. That means the occurrence of chemical incidents need an enabling 
condition to initiate the chemical hazards. To identify the occurrences of chemical hazards of 
processes or tasks, the importance of identification of the enabling condition is as well as that 
of identification of the intrinsic hazards of chemicals. A checklist, as shown in Table 1, was 
designed to identify the intrinsic hazards of highly hazardous chemicals used in processes and 
tasks which will supply the conditions to initiate such chemical hazards while derived from 
abnormal conditions of processes. The final purpose of this method is loss control of the 
chemical hazards, thus, a worksheet, displayed in Table 2, was designed to identify the hazards 
of the derived tasks and to prevent and/or minimize the consequences of the hazards. After 
completing Table 1, the intrinsic hazards of chemicals and which tasks or processes are 
possible to supply the enabling condition were identified, the next step is to identify the 
hazards of the derived tasks or processes and the necessary safeguards by Table 2. 
 
The intrinsic hazards of chemicals 
 
The purpose of the checklist of the intrinsic hazards of chemicals (Table 1) is to identify 
which tasks or processes may supply the enabling conditions to initiate the intrinsic hazards of 
chemicals. Before identifying these tasks or processes, the intrinsic hazards of chemicals need 
to be identified. The intrinsic hazards of chemicals considered in this method include toxicity, 
flammability, and reactivity. In this method, poison and corrosion are regarded as the 
consequences of the toxic hazard, i.e., corrosion is included in the toxic hazard. Fire and 
explosion are the consequences of the flammable and reactive hazards. 
SDS and other information associated with the chemical hazards are necessary in the 
identification of the intrinsic hazards of chemicals. SDS is the minimum required information. 
It should be very careful that the hazards provided by the SDS always based on the condition of 
normal temperatures and normal pressure [6]. However, the operational conditions are always 
different from normal condition. Since the hazards of chemicals may be different for different 
condition, such hazards in the possible operational conditions should be identified. One 
example is that o,o-dimethyl phosphoramidothioate (DMPAT) is stable at normal temperatures 
and normal pressure but decomposes at temperature greater than 93.5C [6].







Yes No Description Tasks/Processes Supplying 
the Enabling Conditions 
Toxicity □ □ 1. □ Fatality 
2. □ Acute toxicity   
Explanation: 
3. TLV-TWA: 
4. □ Corrosion 
Explanation: 
5. □ Others: 
6. Routes entry: 
   □ Skin;  □ Eye; □ 
Inhalation;  □ Ingestion 
 
Flammability □ □ 1. □ Flammability limits (vol.%): 
2. □ Flash point (C): 
3. □ Auto-ignition temperature 
(AIT) (C): 
□ AIT < room temperature   
□ AIT < process temperature   
4. □ Dust explosion 
Flammability limits (kg/m3): 
5. □ Others: 
 
Reactivity □ □ 1. □ Decomposition 
Onset temperature (C): 
Decomposition 
products/hazards: 
2. □ Polymerization 
 
Onset temperature (C): 
3. □ Incompatibility 
Incompatibility with various 
substances: 
Incompatibility with various 
substances in plant: 
4. □ Sensitive to shocks 

























Consequence Cause of 
Deviation 






        □ □  
        □ □  
        □ □  
        □ □  
        □ □  
        □ □  
Any intrinsic hazard of concerned chemical should be marked and be described in the field 
of Description. The properties characterize the intrinsic hazards of chemicals are displayed and 
prompted in the field of Description. For the case of toxic hazard, fatality, acute toxicity, and 
corrosion are highlighted, in addition to the threshold limit value – time weighted average 
(TLV-TWA) value is required. If the acute toxicity or corrosion exists, the details may be 
described, if necessary. Other toxic hazards or any information useful to assist in understanding 
of the toxic hazards can also be described. As mentioned above, one of the purposes of the 
checklist is to assist in identification of the tasks or processes may supply the enabling 
conditions, the routes entry for the concerned chemical was required. 
For liquids and gases, the values of flammability limits, flash point and auto-ignition 
temperature (AIT) are required to be filled in, if the flammability hazard existed and these 
values are available. It is also encourage to fill in the values for solid chemicals, if any of these 
values are available. The checklist also prompted that whether the AIT is less than room 
temperature or process temperature in order to identify the fire and explosion hazards for the 
leakage. For solid particles, the dust explosion is taken into account. If the dust explosion 
hazard exists, the flammability limits are required. Other flammable hazards can also be 
described. 
The reactivity hazards considered the reactivity of the pure substances and the 
incompatibility of the concerned chemical with the possible chemicals. Decomposition and 
polymerization reactions are taken into account for the reactivity of the pure substances. The 
onset temperatures of the decomposition and polymerization are required in order to identify 
possible tasks or processes, which will supply temperatures being greater than the onset 
temperature, if possible. If decomposition reactions produce toxic or flammable materials, it is 
suggested to write down the decomposition products in order to consider the secondary disaster. 
The incompatible materials existed in the plant with the concerned chemical were required to 
be identified. In addition, whether the concerned chemical is sensitive to shocks was required to 
be identified. As the cases of toxic and flammable hazards, other reactive hazards can also be 
described. 
The detailed cause of the hazards is not the focus of the analysis of the intrinsic hazards of 
chemicals; which condition will initiate the hazards is just the focus. Take example of high 
temperature resulting in thermal explosion for the reactive materials, which cause, 
decomposition, polymerization, or oxidation, resulted in explosion is not the key-point, which 
tasks or processes may supply a high temperature condition to initiate the thermal explosion is 
just the key-point. 
In addition to identify the intrinsic hazards of chemicals, the other and more important 
purpose of the checklist is to identify which tasks or processes may supply the enabling 
condition. Based on the enabling condition of initiating the intrinsic hazards of chemicals, the 
analyzers should think which tasks or processes may supply such an enabling condition, and 
write down the identified tasks or processes in the column of Tasks/Processes Supplying the 
Enabling Conditions. The enabling conditions are always different for different intrinsic 
hazards of chemicals, thus, the identified tasks or processes are always different for different 
intrinsic hazards of chemicals. Write down the identified tasks or processes in the field of 
corresponding intrinsic hazards of chemicals. 
Two examples are given below for thinking which tasks or processes may supply the 
enabling condition. Take the first example of a raw material, which will decompose violently at 
high temperatures, it should be thought which tasks or processes, including be derived out from 
abnormal condition, may supply the condition of high temperatures. One situation is that 
crystallization of the raw material at low temperature derives out the heating process for such a 
material. The failure of heating system, irrespective of operational error or failure of the 
temperature control loop, will resulted in high temperatures. Since the accidents always 
occurred in the conditions of safeguard unavailable, the worst condition should be taken into 
account. The other example is for a solid particle material with sensitive to shocks, such as 
BPO, the analyzers should think which abnormal conditions may derive out the shocking of 
such a material. One situation is that such a solid material sticking in the feed pipe may make 
the operators to knock the feed pipe, intuitively, in order to operate smoothly. 
Since the hazards attributed to the process deviation from the standard condition and the 
hazards in the tasks with standard operating procedure can be identified by the HAZOP and 
JSA analysis, respectively, this proposed method is suggested to focus on the tasks or processes, 
that is unable or not easy to be analyzed by HAZOP or JSA, such as those derived from 
abnormal conditions of processes, although this method can identify the hazards of normal 
operations. Therefore, it is suggested only to write down the tasks or processes in absence of 
analysis by HAZOP and JSA. 
 
The process (task) hazards 
 
After completing the checklist of the intrinsic hazards of chemicals, the tasks or processes, 
which may supply the enabling condition to initiate the hazards of concerned chemicals, will be 
identified. However, whether the protection is enough was not identified. The worksheet of 
process (task) hazards of this method is used to assist in analyzing how to prevent or minimize 
such chemical hazards. 
As mentioned above, the conditions to initiate the chemical hazards are always different 
for different types of chemical hazards. The hazards of tasks or processes supplying such 
conditions are analyzed, respectively, for different types of chemical hazards; and the hazard 
classification, toxicity, flammability, and reactivity, should be marked in the column of the 
worksheet. The hazardous information identified in the column of Description of checklist of 
intrinsic hazards of chemicals can be copied or described more detailed to the column of 
Hazard Description of the worksheet of the process (task) hazards to prompt the intrinsic 
hazard of the concerned chemical. Copy the identified tasks or processes in field of 
Tasks/Processes Supplying the Enabling Conditions of the checklist to the field of 
Tasks/Processes Derived from Abnormal Conditions. The column of Cause Deriving out the 
Tasks/Processes is filled in with abnormal condition deriving out the task, such as 
crystallization of raw material deriving out the heating process. 
Write down the developing sequence of the impact of the intrinsic hazards of the 
concerned chemical from the initial event for the identified task in the column of Consequence. 
All the possible consequences, including the worst consequence and the other ones, are 
suggested to be described. Since the disasters always happened in the situations of safeguards 
unavailable, the safeguards should be assumed to be unavailable in the identification of the 
consequence. In addition, the consequences, occurred everywhere, should be taken into account. 
The impact, such as fatalities and injuries of people, rather than consequence, such as fire and 
explosion, should be described. Consequence is just an intermedium sequence, and impact is 
actually the final results. It is suggested to describe the detailed sequence of the events from the 
initial event for the identified task or process to the final impact, since it can assist in 
identifying the safeguards and suggestions from the initial event through the intermedium 
sequence to the final impact. 
Some derived tasks/processes initiate the chemical hazards without requiring any deviation. 
However, others initiate such hazards only in the situation of process deviation. In the case of 
knocking the feed pipe of BPO to let the stuck BPO enter the reactor, the explosion will occur 
while knocking the pipe, no deviation is necessary. For the case of heating a reactive material 
to remove the crystallization of such a material, only the failure of heating system may result in 
thermal explosion; the deviation of high temperature is necessary. If the deviation is necessary, 
fill in the column of Cause of Deviation with the deviation and the cause of such a deviation. 
Otherwise, fill in with “none”. 
The column of Safeguards need to be filled in existing safeguards, including engineering 
and management controls. The function of safeguards includes prevention of the hazards 
occurrence and mitigation of the hazards consequences. Based on the existing safeguards, it is 
required to judge whether the protection is sufficient. Some tips, asking the following questions, 
are useful in the judgement: 
(1). Are there corresponding measures for all the consequences and causes of deviations? 
(2). If alarm is a safeguard, do the corresponding measures include action plans? 
(3). Is the risk acceptable? 
(4). Are the reliabilities of the safeguards acceptable? 
(5). Can the derived task prevent the occurrence of the hazards? 
If the protection is insufficient, comments and suggestions are necessary. Both the 
management and engineering controls are suggested. The fourteen elements of process safety 
management, as suggested by OSHA [4], are recommended, but not limited, for the 
management control, if they are applicable. The suggestions of management, such as safe 
precautions, safe operating procedure of trouble shooting, training of safe precautions or safe 
operating procedure, are useful. The information filled in the column of Consequence can be 
used to assist in proposing suggestions. As mentioned above, the detailed sequence of the 
events from the initial event through the intermedium sequence to the final impact were 
described in the column of Consequence, the lack of safeguards in each step can be identified 
and useful suggestions can be included for the steps of lacking safeguards. These suggestions 
include elimination of the initial events, protection measures of avoid evolution from initial 




The BPO explosion accident mentioned in section INTRODUCTION was selected as a 
case study, and BPO is the studied chemical. The checklist of intrinsic hazards of chemicals was 
completed based on the information of SDS provided by Science Lab [3], and was shown in 
Table 3. Table 3 indicated that there are toxicity, flammability, and reactivity hazards for the 
BPO. This case study was focused on the accident, thus, the characteristic of sensitive to shocks 
of reactivity hazard was the spotlight. The SDS indicated that BPO may self-reactive under 
conditions of shock [3]. In the affected plant, BPO was used as an initiator, and was feed to the 
reactor through a pipe by gravity. In the normal operation, the conditions of shock do not exist 
for BPO. In practice, the BPO in the conditions of shock is only occurred at the situation of 
knocking by the operators due to BPO being stuck in the pipe and unable to enter the reactor. 
More clearly said, the operators knock the pipe stuck with BPO to let the BPO enter the reactor 
smoothly. The abnormal condition of process is BPO cannot enter the reactor, the derived task is 
knocking the feed pipe of BPO to let the BPO enter the reactor smoothly, and the derived task 
supply the enabling condition, shocking condition, to initiate the reactivity hazard of BPO. The 
abnormal condition and the derived task were described in the field of Tasks/Processes 
Supplying the Enabling Conditions corresponding to reactivity hazard. 
Since this case study focused on the accident, Table 4 only displayed the related part of the 
completed worksheets of process (task) hazards for reactivity hazards. The relative information 
of the accident were filled in the fields of Hazard Classification, Hazard Description. The 
identified derived task and the abnormal condition were filled in the fields of Tasks/Processes 
Derived from Abnormal Conditions and Cause Deriving out the Tasks/Processes. The 
consequence of knocking the BPO is that BPO will explode and resulted in casualties, properties 
damages and processes interruption. Since the BPO will explode in the presence of shocks 
without need any deviation, the field of Cause of Deviation was filled in “none”. There is not any 
safeguard for this hazard, thus, “none” was filled in the field of Safeguards. Since the tasks or 
processes derived from abnormal conditions always not identified, the safeguards for the hazards 
of such tasks or processes are always lacked. It is apparent that the protection of this hazard is 
not sufficient. There is not any prevention and protection measure for this hazard, thus, the 




The chemical hazards of tasks/processes derived from abnormal condition of process 
cannot be identified by the traditional hazard identification method, such as HAZOP and JSA. 
A method to identify such chemical hazards was proposed. One checklist to identify the tasks 
or processes supplying the condition to initiate the intrinsic hazards of chemicals and one 
worksheet to identify the hazards of such processes (tasks) were developed to assist the hazard 
identification. One explosion accident attributed to the knocking of feed pipe stuck with BPO 
was used as a case study. This proposed method can be used in identification of the hazards of 
tasks/processes derived from abnormal conditions of processes and give useful suggestions. In 
addition, the chemical hazards during the normal operations can also be identified by this 
proposed method. 
Table 3 Checklist of the intrinsic hazards of chemicals for BPO 
 
Chemical: BPO 




Yes No Description Tasks/Processes 
Supplying the Enabling 
Conditions 
Toxicity ■ □ 1. □ Fatality 
2. ■ Acute toxicity   




3. TLV-TWA: 5mg/m3 
4. □ Corrosion 
Explanation: 
5. □ Others: 
6. Routes entry: 
   ■ Skin;  ■ Eye; ■ Inhalation;  
■ Ingestion 
Flammability ■ □ 1. □ Flammability limits (vol.%): 
2. □ Flash point (C): 
3. ■ Auto-ignition temperature (AIT) 
(C): 80C 
□ AIT < room temperature   
□ AIT < process temperature   
4. □ Dust explosion 
Flammability limits (kg/m3): 
5. ■ Others: Flammable in presence of 
combustible materials  
 
Reactivity ■ □ 1. ■ Decomposition 
Onset temperature (C): 103C 
Decomposition products/hazards: 
2. □ Polymerization 
Onset temperature (C): 
3. ■ Incompatibility 
Incompatibility with various 
substances:  
acids, alkalis, combustible 
materials, metal 
Incompatibility with various 
substances in plant: 
4. ■ Sensitive to shocks 
5. ■ Others: Explosive in presence of 
heat;  
Instability temperature: > 
75C 
1. If the BPO stuck on 
the feed pipe, the 
operators will knock 
the feed pipe to let 
the BPO enter the 
reactor smoothly. 
 
Table 4 Worksheet of the process (task) hazards for BPO 
 
Chemical: BPO 
















Consequence Cause of 
Deviation 










feed pipe of 
BPO to let the 














None None □ ■ 1. Reduce the 
concentration of 
BPO from 98% to 
75% to prevent 
the probability of 
explosion. 
2. Revise the feeding 
procedure of 
BPO as dissolve 
the BPO in the 
solvent before 
feeding to the 
reactor. 
3. Set the emergency 
SOP of BPO 
being unable to 
enter the reactor, 
and train the 
operators. 
4. Post the 
precaution of 
“No knocking for 
BPO”. 
        □ □  
        □ □  
        □ □  
        □ □  
        □ □  
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